


CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1441
22 January 1997

Original: ENGLISH



LETTER DATED 21 JANUARY 1997 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE CONFERENCE FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT CLINTON FOR THE OPENING OF THE 1997 SESSION
OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Attached is a copy of a Presidential Statement for the opening of the
1997 session of the Conference on Disarmament issued on 17 January 1997.

I would be grateful if this could be issued as an official document of
the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to all member States and non-
member participant States of the Conference.

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Statement by President Clinton for the Opening of the 1997 CD Session

In my message to the Conference on Disarmament three years ago, I urged the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban at the earliest possible time. Your success in that negotiation, and the subsequent adoption of the Treaty by the United Nations General Assembly, will help create a safer world. The successful conclusion of the negotiation is evidence of the Conference's potential to respond to the challenges it now faces.

Now the Conference on Disarmament should take the next steps on the road to a more secure world:

-- prompt conclusion of a ban on producing fissile material for use in nuclear explosives. Effectively cutting off the spigot for more nuclear weapons is a necessary step toward, and would greatly contribute to, the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament.


-- negotiation as soon as possible of a comprehensive, global ban on anti-personnel landmines. These weapons of war have caused terrible suffering to innocent civilians and represent an enormous obstacle to restoring a more hopeful life after a conflict has ended. All the children of the world deserve to walk the earth in safety.

I call on the Conference to press forward with a renewed sense of purpose, to demonstrate to the world its capability to take these key steps to advance the process of nuclear and conventional disarmament.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1442
22 January 1997

Original: ENGLISH



LETTER DATED 21 JANUARY 1997 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE CONFERENCE FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A
STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY OF THE WHITE HOUSE AND A FACT SHEET
ON UNITED STATES' INITIATIVES ON ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES

Attached is a copy of a Statement by the Press Secretary of the White
House on Anti-Personnel Landmines and a Fact Sheet on United States'
initiatives on Anti-Personnel Landmines, issued on 17 January 1997.

I would be grateful if these texts could be issued as an official
document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to all member States
and non-member participant States of the Conference.

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

January 17, 1997

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

United States Announces Next Steps on Anti-Personnel Landmines

President Clinton today announced that when the Conference on Disarmament opens its 1997 session in Geneva on Monday, the United States will seek to initiate negotiations on a worldwide treaty banning the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. As the President said before the UN General Assembly in September, "Our children deserve to walk the earth in safety." The United States hopes that the nations of the world will work with us to create that safety and ban the scourge of landmines, which every year kill or wound more than 25,000 civilians.

To give further impetus to this effort, the President has decided that the United States will observe a permanent ban on the export and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. This action builds on the Landmine Export Moratorium Act sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy, which has temporarily prohibited the export and transfer of these weapons since 1992. We urge all other nations to join us in stopping the export and transfer of these mines, which will both hasten the completion of a comprehensive ban and save many innocent lives. As another step toward a ban, the President has decided to cap our anti-personnel landmine stockpile at the current level of inventory.

President Clinton last May announced the United States's intention to achieve as soon as possible a worldwide ban on landmines. In December in the UN General Assembly, nations voted 155-0 in favor of the U.S.-initiated resolution urging states to pursue such an agreement.

After extensive consultations with many countries, the President believes that the Conference on Disarmament offers the most practical and effective forum for achieving our aim of a ban that is global. Both the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention were successfully negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament.

The United States looks forward to the opening of the Conference on Disarmament on Monday as an opportunity to begin discussion of these initiatives and to make early progress on starting negotiations. At the same time, the United States welcomes efforts outside that forum, including the free-standing process initiated by Canada, that can help provide momentum to our common goal.

#

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

January 17, 1997

FACT SHEET

U.S. Initiatives on Anti-Personnel Landmines

People in 64 countries, mostly in the developing world, face a daily threat of being killed or maimed by the estimated 100 million landmines buried around the globe. The United States is committed to ending the carnage and devastation caused by anti-personnel landmines (APL) -- the hidden killers that murder and maim more than 25,000 people every year. In addition to those steps announced today, the United States has already undertaken a number of important actions.

Negotiations to Ban APL

On May 16, 1996, the President announced a new U.S. APL policy, which included a commitment to aggressively pursue an international agreement to ban use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines with a view to completing the negotiation as soon as possible.

On December 10, in the UN General Assembly, nations voted overwhelmingly (155-0) in favor of the U.S.-initiated resolution urging states to pursue an agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines.

Today we announced that, at the opening of the Conference on Disarmament on January 20, the United States will begin work with other member nations to initiate negotiations on an agreement to ban APL. This 61-member forum in Geneva, Switzerland includes most of the world's strongest landmine ban advocates and most of the world's major APL producers. It is

the forum in which the recently-signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was negotiated, as well as the Chemical Weapons Convention.

APL Export and Transfer Ban

Since 1992, the United States has observed by law a temporary moratorium on the export and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, but this law expires in three years.

Today, we announced that the United States will observe a permanent ban on export and transfer of APL. We encourage all other nations to join us in a permanent ban on APL export and transfer to end forever the spread of these weapons.

APL Stockpile

As the President announced in May, the United States plans to destroy by the end of 1999 about three million non-self-destructing APL. Destruction of these mines is well underway. The United States will retain only those non-self-destructing APL needed for training and for defense in Korea.

Today we announced that the United States will cap its APL stockpile at the current level of inventory. We encourage other nations to do so as well.

APL Use Restrictions

On January 7, the President transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification the amended Mines Protocol to the 58-nation Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). The United States led the effort to strengthen the Protocol, which establishes new norms that can protect civilians, even as countries work toward the goal of an APL ban.

The Protocol now expands the scope of the original Protocol to include internal armed conflicts, where most civilian mine casualties have occurred; requires that all remotely-delivered anti-personnel landmines be equipped with self-destruct and self-deactivation features to a very high degree of reliability; requires that all

non-self-destructing mines only be used within marked and monitored fields; and that all APL be detectable, to facilitate mine clearance.

Expanding Demining Capabilities

In May 1996, the President directed the Department of Defense to significantly expand its humanitarian demining program to train and assist other countries in developing effective demining programs.

The Department of Defense was also directed last May to undertake a substantial program to develop improved mine detection and clearing technology and to share this improved technology with the broader international community. Research and development funding for this effort was increased in Fiscal Year 1997 to \$14.7m.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1443

30 January 1997

Original: ENGLISH

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Proposal

Draft mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on a
"Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines"

The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee under item ~~one~~ of its agenda on a "Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines" to negotiate, for conclusion at the earliest possible date, a universal, effectively verifiable and legally-binding international agreement to ban totally the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines.

As a vital first step towards such an agreement, the Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate intensively a universal, effectively verifiable and legally-binding international agreement to ban totally the export, import or transfer of all types of anti-personnel landmines, as well as of their components and of anti-personnel landmine technology.

The Conference further directs the Ad Hoc Committee to consider and make recommendations on the further steps necessary to achieve the goal of a universal, effectively verifiable and legally-binding international agreement to ban totally the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines.

Pursuant to its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee will take into account the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, in particular the amended Protocol II, as well as all relevant existing proposals and future initiatives.

The Conference requests the Ad Hoc Committee to report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1997 session.

UN

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

[REDACTED]

CD/1444

Y 4 February 1997

MAY 19 1997

Original: ENGLISH

[REDACTED]

**LETTER DATED 29 JANUARY 1997 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE CONFERENCE FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRIA
TRANSMITTING THE "FEDERAL LAW ON THE BAN OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES"
ADOPTED BY THE AUSTRIAN PARLIAMENT**

I have the honour to transmit to you in the annex a working translation into English of the "Federal Law on the Ban of Anti-Personnel Mines" recently adopted by the Austrian Parliament.

Austria was a co-sponsor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45/S "An international agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines" adopted on 10 December 1996 and has observed an export-moratorium for anti-personnel mines since October 1994. In the course of the year 1995 Austria has destroyed completely its remaining stocks of anti-personnel mines. With the above mentioned Federal Law, Austria has now taken a further effective step on the national level in order to fulfil its solemn commitment to ban totally the use, stockpiling, production and transfer anti-personnel landmines.

On the multilateral level, Austria is a staunch supporter of the efforts to complete as soon as possible an effective, legally binding international agreement on a total ban of anti-personnel landmines. In this context, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that Austria has already distributed through its embassies a first tentative draft of such a convention and has invited comments thereon. As I have stated in my recent intervention in the Plenary of the Conference on Disarmament, Austria now - as a further step - invites all interested States to an expert meeting on the text of a convention on the total ban of anti-personnel mines. This meeting is going to take place in Vienna from 12th to 14th February 1997 and will proceed on the basis of the above mentioned first Austrian draft convention.

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for this letter and its annex to be distributed as an official CD document to all delegations participating in the work on the Conference.

(Signed):

**Harald Kreid
Ambassador
Permanent Representative**

FEDERAL LAW ON THE BAN OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES
(Working translation)

DEFINITIONS

ARTICLE 1

In the context of this Federal Law:

1. „Anti-personnel mine“ means a means of combat designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed to detonate or explode by the presence, proximity or contact of persons,
2. „Anti-detection mechanism“ means a device designed to bring an anti-personnel mine to explosion or detonation by the use of a mine-detecting device.

PROHIBITIONS

ARTICLE 2

The production, acquisition, sale, procurement, import, export, transit, use and possession of anti-personnel mines as well as of anti-detection mechanisms shall be prohibited.

RESTRICTIONS

ARTICLE 3

1. Mines earmarked exclusively for training purposes within the Federal Army or the Mine Clearance Service or the Explosives Disposal Service are not subject to the prohibition set out in Article 2.
2. The import, possession and the stockpiling of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of immediate delaboration or other ways of destruction are not subject to the prohibition set out in Article 2.

DESTRUCTION OF EXISTING STOCKPILES

ARTICLE 4

Existing stockpiles of anti-personnel mines or anti-detection mechanisms prohibited under Article 2 shall be reported to the Federal Ministry of the Interior within one month and shall be destroyed by the said ministry not later than one year after the entry into force of this Federal Law upon reimbursement of costs.

PENALTY

ARTICLE 5

Whoever, and even if only by negligence, contravenes the prohibition of Article 2 of this Federal Law, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for up to two years or a fine of up to 360 daily rates, if the offence is not subject to a more severe penalty under an other Federal Law.

CONFISCATION AND FORFEITURE

ARTICLE 6

1. Anti-personnel mines or anti-detection mechanisms as well as components thereof which are object of an act punishable under Article 5 shall be confiscated by court order.
2. Machines and facilities used in the production of items under the prohibition set out in Article 2 can be declared forfeited by the court. They shall be secured at the owner's expense so that those items cannot be further used in contravention of the prohibition set out in Article 2.
3. Means used to transport items under the prohibition of Article 2 may be declared forfeited by the court.
4. Items under forfeiture according to paragraphs 2 and 3 shall become property of the Federation. Items confiscated under paragraph 1 shall become property of the Federation and must be reported to the Federal Ministry of the Interior for destruction in accordance with Article 4.

EXECUTION

ARTICLE 7

Entrusted with the execution of this Federal Law are:

1. With respect to Article 3, paragraph 1 the Federal Minister of the Interior and the Federal Minister of Defence,
2. with respect to articles 5 and 6 the Federal Minister of Justice and
3. with respect to the other provisions the Federal Minister of the Interior.

ENTRY INTO FORCE

ARTICLE 8

This Federal Law enters into force on 1 January 1997.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1445

13 February 1997

Original: ENGLISH

JAPAN

Proposal to appoint a Special Coordinator on Nuclear Disarmament

The Conference on Disarmament appoints a Special Coordinator to conduct consultations with its members to identify the issue(s) in the field of nuclear disarmament which could be negotiated in the Conference and to report to the Conference on the result of these consultations no later than the conclusion of the 1997 session.

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

1. Japan considers the issue of nuclear disarmament to be a high priority for the Conference on Disarmament.
2. While the Conference may not necessarily take up every aspect of nuclear disarmament, it is clear that there exist appropriate issues in the field of nuclear disarmament to be negotiated in the Conference.
3. The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty negotiations should commence immediately as the next item for negotiations in the Conference.
4. In addition to the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, the Conference should identify the issue(s) of nuclear disarmament to be negotiated in the future. Unfortunately the basic lines of thought for dealing with nuclear disarmament have continued to be divergent. Likewise, a convergence of views on the forum, or mechanism, in which to identify the issue has not yet evolved.
5. Under such circumstances, it is most practical for the Conference to have as flexible a mechanism as possible, in order to identify the issues for future negotiation(s). In this regard, a Special Coordinator can have bilateral, multilateral or any other form of consultations and discussions, and, thus, can provide an appropriate forum for nuclear disarmament talks in the Conference.
6. The Conference should not further delay addressing the issue of nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, the Conference should start its first step, even if a modest one, to explore various possibilities for nuclear disarmament negotiations.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1446
14 February 1997

Original: ENGLISH

Agenda for the 1997 Session

(adopted at the 755th plenary meeting on 14 February 1997)

Taking into account, *inter alia*, the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and pending the conclusion of its consultations on the review of its agenda, and without prejudice to their outcome, the Conference adopts the following agenda for its 1997 session:

1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
2. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
3. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
4. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
7. Transparency in armaments.
8. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1447
17 February 1997

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 FEBRUARY 1997 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A COPY OF A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ISSUED IN HONOR OF THE THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OPENING FOR SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO

Attached is a copy of a Presidential Statement issued in honor of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Opening for Signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

I would be grateful if you would issue the statement as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all members States and non-member participant States of the Conference.

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



GE.97-60194

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT CLINTON TO THE EXTRAORDINARY
SPECIAL SESSION OF THE OPANAL GENERAL
CONFERENCE ON THE OCCASION OF THE THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
OPENING FOR SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO

I AM PLEASED TO SEND GREETINGS TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS EXTRAORDINARY SPECIAL GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. LET ME CONGRATULATE THE STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO, ON THE OCCASION OF THE THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DATE THAT THE TREATY WAS OPENED FOR SIGNATURE.

FOR THIRTY YEARS, THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO HAS STOOD AS AN IMPORTANT BARRIER TO THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIS HEMISPHERE. IT REFLECTS THE EXTRAORDINARY FORESIGHT OF ITS DRAFTERS, WHO WERE AMONG THE FIRST TO TAKE UP THE CHALLENGE POSED BY THE DANGERS OF SUCH PROLIFERATION AND TO CODIFY WHAT IS NOW AN INTERNATIONAL NORM OF NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION. THE UNITED STATES, AS A PARTY TO THE TWO ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, REMAINS A STRONG SUPPORTER OF THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO THAT HAS SERVED AS INSPIRATION AND MODEL FOR OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE TREATIES.

WE CELEBRATE THIS ANNIVERSARY AT A TIME OF UNPRECEDENTED PROGRESS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND DISARMAMENT. LAST FALL, I SIGNED FOR THE UNITED STATES THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY, WHICH WILL END ALL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE TESTS FOR ALL TIME AND WILL HELP TO PREVENT THE NUCLEAR POWERS FROM DEVELOPING MORE ADVANCED AND DANGEROUS WEAPONS. ALSO LAST YEAR, THE UNITED STATES AND THE OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES SIGNED THE PROTOCOLS TO THE TREATIES OF RARATONGA AND PELINDABA, ADDING OUR TANGIBLE SUPPORT TO THE NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES CREATED BY THESE AGREEMENTS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC AND AFRICA. TWO YEARS AGO, THE PARTIES TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AGREED TO EXTEND THAT TREATY INDEFINITELY, MAKING IT A PERMANENT PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE.

ALL OF THESE ACCOMPLISHMENTS MAKE US MORE SECURE. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO LIFT THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. WE MUST CONTINUE TO BUILD ON THIS FOUNDATION WITH PATIENCE AND PERSEVERANCE. IT IS MY STRONG HOPE THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT WILL MOVE QUICKLY TO NEGOTIATE A BAN ON PRODUCING FISSILE MATERIAL FOR USE IN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. THE UNITED STATES ALSO IS PREPARED TO PURSUE FURTHER

REDUCTIONS AND LIMITS ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS ONCE THE RUSSIAN DUMA APPROVES START II. AND WE MUST CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY SAFEGUARDS THAT UNDERPINS BOTH THE NPT AND THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO.

THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO WAS AN HISTORIC AND EARLY STEP BY THE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO STEM THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO DO ITS PART TO REDUCE AND ULTIMATELY ELIMINATE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ALL REGIONS FOR ALL TIME.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1448
13 March 1997


Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 MARCH 1997 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE IN
GENEVA TRANSMITTING A LETTER BY H.E. ZORAN THALER MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SLOVENIA TO THE 1997 SESSION OF THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Attached is a letter from H.E. Zoran Thaler, Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Slovenia, to the 1997 session of the Conference on
Disarmament issued on 11 March 1997.

I would be grateful if this letter could be issued as an official
document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to all member States
and non-member participant States of the Conference.

(Signed): Dr. Anton Bebler
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Ljubljana, 11 March 1997

Dear Mr President,

Slovenia is a young country that obtained UN membership in May 1992. In the last five years of its independence, Slovenia achieved positive results in the process of political and economic transformation. Increasing cooperation with its neighbours and in the region enabled Slovenia to reach a high degree of economic and political stability. We believe that such a policy should be considered a contribution to lasting stability in the region.

After its successful transformation, Slovenia is now ready to take over not only its responsibility for regional arrangements, but also its share of responsibility for the international peace and stability.

For this reason Slovenia seeks membership in the Conference on Disarmament. Slovenia applied for membership in April 1991, in order to participate actively in the central role the Conference has in developing the infrastructure for disarmament machinery. Moreover, it is one of the strategic goals of Slovenia to join the Conference. We firmly believe that Slovenia is able to meet all expectations and work with other member states so as to give its full contribution to the fulfilment of the demanding tasks which await the Conference on Disarmament.

Disarmament continues to be among the most important areas in which the role of the Conference is fundamental. It can be said that in the recent years the Conference has solidified its leading and coordinating role in this area and proved to be the most important multilateral forum for disarmament affairs. The conclusion and the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the elaboration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty bear witness to that.

The significance of the Conference is a fact which enables small nations like Slovenia to work on equal basis with other nations in the negotiations which lead towards the conclusion of international disarmament agreements. We consider membership in the Conference as a legitimate right of all states which want to present their views on disarmament and take their share of responsibility for a safer world of tomorrow. The enlargement of the Conference will allow even greater representation of views which are of critical importance to humanity.

We are pleased that many other governments share our opinion. The fact that more than 150 states in the UN General Assembly voted in favour of the resolution on the expansion of the Conference on Disarmament (Resolution A/C.1/51/L.1 rev.1) has proved our considerations to be right and widely accepted. Many countries already expressed their support to our application.

Within this context, Mr President, I would like to ask you to give active support to the application of the Republic of Slovenia for full membership in the Conference on Disarmament. My Government would like to contribute substantially to the successful work of the Conference by presenting its views on the issues of critical importance for the international community.

We expect the Conference to address the question of the enlargement as a matter of priority and to facilitate the full and early representation of the remaining applicant States in its work.

Please accept, Mr President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed): **Zoran THALER**

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1449
18 March 1997


ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 17 MARCH 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON
DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A MESSAGE FROM THE MINISTER FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE CONFERENCE
ON DISARMAMENT ON THE OCCASION OF THE ACCESSION OF A
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE POST OF
PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

I have the honour to forward to you a message from the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament in
connection with the accession of a representative of the Russian Federation to
the post of President of the CD.

Please take the necessary steps to have this document issued as an
official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed among the
delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States of
the Conference which are participating in its work.

(Signed) Grigori V. Berdennikov
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation
to the Conference on Disarmament



MESSAGE FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACCESSION OF A REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE POST OF PRESIDENT
OF THE CD

Greetings to the participants in the session of the Conference on
Disarmament.

The activities of the Conference on Disarmament - the sole forum in
which practical talks on disarmament issues are conducted on a multilateral
basis and in a global framework - are followed with attention and interest in
Russia. Our country strives to contribute to the success of the work of the
Conference, whose achievements have earned it well-deserved authority in the
eyes of the world community. They include such important international
instruments in the field of arms limitation and disarmament as the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin
Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, etc.

I should like to assure the participants in the Conference that, in the
post of President, Russia will do its utmost to ensure the success of the work
of this forum.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) E. PRIMAKOV

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1450
20 March 1997

Original: ENGLISH

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

Proposal on
The Programme of Work

1. The Conference on Disarmament decides, without prejudice to any future decisions on the organizational framework of other items, to establish:
 - I. An Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 4 "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" with the mandate as described in CD/1121.
 - II. An Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 7 to consider means of promoting transparency in armaments.
2. The Conference also decides to appoint a special coordinator to seek the views of its members on the most appropriate arrangement to deal with issues under agenda item 1.
3. The Conference decides further to appoint a special coordinator to seek the views of its members within agenda item 6 on the most appropriate arrangement to deal with the issues on which consensus could be achieved.
4. The special coordinators appointed under paragraphs 2 and 3 above shall present an interim report at the end of May and a final report not later than mid-June 1997 to the Conference.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT


CD/1451
26 March 1997

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 MARCH 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SOUTH AFRICA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A PRESS STATEMENT DATED 20 FEBRUARY 1997 BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE CONCERNING THE POLICY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ON ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES AND THE MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MANDELA TO THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL NGO CONFERENCE ON LANDMINES, MAPUTO, 25 TO 28 FEBRUARY 1997

I have the honour to attach, for circulation in an official document of the Conference, a press statement dated 20 February 1997 by the Minister of Defence concerning the policy of the South African Government on anti-personnel landmines and the message from President Mandela to the Fourth International NGO Conference on Landmines, Maputo, 25 to 28 February 1997.

(Signed): J.S. Selebi
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



PRESS STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, THE HON. MR J MODISE:
SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT POLICY ON ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES,
PARLIAMENT, 20 FEBRUARY 1997

QUOTE

Members of the media,

Thank you for your attendance here today.

Together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I have called this press conference to announce the policy position of the South African Government on anti-personnel landmines.

I am pleased to inform you that, on my recommendation and motivation, Cabinet decided, on the 19th of February 1997, to ban the use, development, production and stockpiling of anti-personnel landmines - with immediate effect.

We thereby fully endorse the conviction of the International Committee of the Red Cross, that, and I quote:

"The limited military utility of anti-personnel mines is far outweighed by the appalling humanitarian consequences of their use in actual conflicts.

On this basis their prohibition and elimination should be pursued as a matter of utmost urgency by governments and the entire international community".

Ladies and Gentlemen, in adopting this position, the South African Government, through our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is reinforcing efforts to bring about a universal ban on these mines and their complete elimination.

We will resolutely pursue this objective, and do everything possible to encourage and influence governments and international institutions to adopt this position.

Our commitment in this respect is a matter of record since our accession to office.

In 1994 we announced a moratorium on the export of all land mines. This was followed, in 1996, by a complete ban on exports of all forms of land mines. And yesterday, the 19th of February 1997, this commitment was taken a step further when Cabinet decided on a total prohibition on the use, development, production and stockpiling of anti-personnel land mines - with immediate effect.

In terms of this decision, we will be preparing to destroy our stockpile of existing anti-personnel land mines, which amount to 160 000. We will be retaining a very limited and verifiable number of anti-personnel land mines, solely for training specific military

personnel in de-mining techniques and for research into assisting the de-mining process. All de-mining training and research will be carried out under the strictest government supervision and control.

I must stress, that until all countries have co-operated in eliminating all stockpiles of anti-personnel land mines, there is no guarantee that they may not be used. As long as the threat exists, our National Defence Force must be capable of dealing with the need to de-activate and clear this menace, and to neutralise it if we are confronted by it in an operational situation. It therefore follows that we must maintain the capability and skill required to perform that task.

Cabinet's decision reflects our determination to help rid the world of the problem of anti-personnel land mines. Each month these mines kill or maim some 2 000 victims around the world - the vast majority of whom are civilians. Their indiscriminate use has had a devastating effect - internationally, in Africa and in our region. In Angola, the number of amputations, resulting from anti-personnel mines, is, tragically, one of the highest in the world, and in Mozambique, thousands of these mines remain uncleared. The injuries from these mines impose an intolerable burden on civil society and a severe constraint on reconstruction and developmental needs.

A heavy responsibility lies on the more developed countries, capable of producing this weapon, to cease production, export and use.

This grave international problem can only be addressed by concerted international acting to restrict the availability and use of land mines, and to alleviate the suffering they cause.

We believe it is possible to confront the menace, and South Africa will do everything possible to assist in the eradication of anti-personnel land mines from the face of our globe.

On a practical level:

At the UN International Meeting on Mine Clearance, held in Geneva in 1995, South Africa pledged assistance to training programmes for the UN Stand-By Capacity for mine clearance - involving management of de-mining, mine lifting and mine awareness.

Regionally, we signed a Declaration of Intent with the Government of Mozambique in 1995, whereby both governments will co-operate in de-mining efforts.

And South Africa is assisting Angola through the training of de-mining personnel for the Angolan De-Mining Institute.

Furthermore, a South African company specialising in de-mining, is involved in de-mining activities in Angola in co-operation with the

United Nations.

In March 1996, we became a State Party to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (and Protocols) - CCW - Which amongst other things, restricts the use of land mines.

In addition to the aforementioned measures, South Africa is a signatory to the Ottawa Declaration of October 1996 - working for a global ban on anti-personnel landmines.

And South Africa was one of the original co-sponsors of the December 1996 UN General Assembly Resolution - supported by 155 countries - on "An international agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines".

The ban I have announced today is an integral part of our Government's overall commitment to the promotion of international peace and security.

With this announcement, we give our fullest support and endorsement of the Fourth International NGO Conference of Land Mines, which will be held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 25 - 28 February 1997.

I pledge that we will do everything possible to help rid the world of the menace of the anti-personnel land mine.

I thank you.

UNQUOTE

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NELSON MANDELA TO THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL
NGO CONFERENCE ON LANDMINES, MAPUTO, 25 - 28 FEBRUARY 1997

QUOTE

The indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines has brought immense suffering to Africa. These terrible weapons are causing death and inhumane injuries to our people. They place severe constraints on reconstruction and development, particularly in rural areas. The legacy of millions of emplaced landmines in Southern Africa, particularly in Angola and Mozambique, have left areas uninhabitable and will pose significant challenges to the region's limited resources and great development needs.

This grave problem can only be addressed by concerted international action which deals with it in a comprehensive manner, and restricts the availability and use of landmines and alleviating the suffering they cause.

South Africa remains fully committed to the Ottawa Declaration we subscribed to in October 1996. In that context we would want to work with others to ensure the earliest possible conclusion of a legally-binding international agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines.

South Africa will furthermore do everything possible to assist in the eradication of anti-personnel landmines. In this regard I give our fullest support and endorsement of the Fourth International NGO Conference on Landmines.

Nelson Mandela
President
Republic of South Africa

UNQUOTE

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1452
27 March 1997

Original: ENGLISH

CHILE, FINLAND, POLAND

Proposal to appoint a
Special Coordinator on Anti-Personnel Landmines

1. The Conference on Disarmament decides to appoint a Special Coordinator to conduct consultations on the most appropriate arrangement to deal with the question of anti-personnel landmines under agenda item 6.
2. The Special Coordinator shall present a report to the Conference on Disarmament before the end of May 1997.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1453

1 April 1997

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 MARCH 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF EGYPT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE
ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A WORKING PAPER FOR A POSSIBLE
MANDATE OF AN AD-HOC COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Bearing in mind the highest priority attached to nuclear disarmament as reflected in SSOD I, and with reference to document CD/1388 dated 14 March 1996 concerning the proposal submitted by the G.21 for the establishment of an Ad-hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament, please find attached a Working Paper submitted by the Delegation of Egypt for a possible mandate of an Ad-hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament.

I would be grateful if you would issue this Working Paper as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) : Ambassador
Mounir Zahran

Working Paper submitted by Egypt

Draft mandate for an Ad-hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament

The Conference decides to establish an Ad-hoc Committee under agenda item 1 on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and on a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices taking into account the report of the special coordinator on this item (CD/1299) and the views relating to the scope of the treaty.

In discharging its function, the Ad-hoc Committee will take into account the Proposal for a Programme of Action for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons submitted by 28 members of the Conference belonging to the Group of 21 (CD/1419) as well as any other existing proposals and future initiatives in this regard.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1454
13 May 1997

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
TRANSMITTING A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION TO THE FIRST SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE OF STATES
PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS AND AN APPEAL TO THE CONFERENCE FROM THE STATE DUMA
OF THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

I have the honour to transmit to you a message from the President of the Russian Federation to the first session of the Conference of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and a message to the Conference from the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

Please take the necessary steps to ensure that these documents are issued as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to delegations of all States members of the Conference and those of non-member States of the Conference which are participating in its work.

(Signed) Grigory V. Berdennikov
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the Russian
Federation to the Conference on Disarmament



THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

**To the first session of the Conference of States Parties
to the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons**

I send sincere greetings to the first session of the Conference of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The entry into force on 29 April 1997 of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the aim of which is the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, is being marked with satisfaction in Russia. This treaty was the outcome of many years of work by the entire international community, in which our country was an active participant. The principal task of the current session is to ensure the safe launching of the Convention machinery, which will guarantee the effectiveness and universality of the treaty.

The Convention has been put before the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation for ratification. The parliament has already begun to work actively on the instrument. In its message to the Conference the State Duma has expressed its intention to complete the ratification process if possible in the autumn of the current year, while underlining the importance of taking into account issues of significance for Russia in the decisions of the Conference.

In the period leading up to ratification of the Convention, Russia intends to refrain from any actions which would detract from the purpose and goals of the Convention. Since the time of signature we have honoured, and will continue to honour, our obligations not to develop and not to produce chemical weapons; not to transfer them directly or indirectly to anyone; not to use chemical weapons; not to carry out any military preparations for their use, or to assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited under the Convention; and not to use chemical riot control agents as means of warfare. We have taken steps to ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are developed, produced and acquired, stored, transferred and used only for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. Preparations are also under way in Russia for the actual destruction of chemical weapons. Federal legislation for the elimination of such weapons has been adopted.

We intend to maintain close relations with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and to discuss issues of cooperation with its leadership. Russia would be ready to provide OPCW with information on its stocks of chemical weapons and their location, and to take part in measures to provide assistance where possible in CW protection and in economic and research cooperation under articles X and XI of the Convention. It is our view that this will be facilitated by the establishment of machinery giving Russia an opportunity to participate in the drafting and adoption of decisions

taking into account its political and defence interests. All this would also create conditions for Russia's entry into OPCW in such a way that it could immediately play a full role in the organization's activities. I hope that the first session of the Conference will carefully address the issues we have raised.

I wish the participants in the first session success in their arduous efforts to settle matters before the Conference in the interests of peace and international security.

B. Yeltsin

Moscow, Kremlin, 6 May 1997

FEDERAL ASSEMBLY - PARLIAMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

APPEAL

FROM THE STATE DUMA

to the Conference of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

On the occasion of the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, referred to below as the Convention, and the opening of the first Conference of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, referred to below as the Conference,

Affirming its commitment to the obligations assumed by the Russian Federation regarding the destruction of chemical weapons,

Wishing to contribute to the achievement of the goals of the Convention,

Acknowledging the need to rule out completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, in the interests of mankind as a whole,

Recognizing the enormous international significance of ratification of the Convention by the Russian Federation and the United States of America,

Appealing to the Conference in accordance with its powers,

The State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation:

Reaffirms its positive attitude to the need for the complete elimination of chemical weapons, as displayed in the adoption of the Federal Chemical Weapons Elimination Act by the State Duma on 25 April 1997;

Affirms that it has embarked on the process of ratification of the Convention, with the intention of completing the process if possible in the autumn of this year if the necessary conditions are met;

Notes that difficulties involved in the ratification of the Convention stem from the exceptionally serious economic situation in Russia, while forecasts for economic development in the near future make it impossible to count on a sharp increase in funding to tackle this problem;

Calls on the Conference to foster the creation of favourable conditions for speeding up the process of ratification of the Convention by the Russian Federation.

The State Duma considers that the following actions would facilitate completion of the process of ratification of the Convention by the Russian Federation:

An effort by the Conference to consider the possibility of extending the deadlines for elimination of chemical weapon stocks, and to take account of the interests of the Russian Federation when addressing other issues, including the procedure governing payment for inspection activities in order to reduce the financial burden on the receiving party, and the conversion of former CW production facilities;

A call on States parties to the Convention by the Conference for a substantial increase in financial assistance to the Russian Federation on the part of States parties to the Convention, and a search for additional sources of such assistance, inter alia using the financial capabilities of international organizations.

The State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation calls on the Conference to regard the circumstances preventing the Russian Federation from ratifying the Convention as cases of force majeure, and accordingly to help it, during the period pending ratification of the Convention by the Russian Federation, to play its due part in the drafting and adoption of key decisions, and to play its role in the governing and executive bodies of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation affirms that the decision on ratification of the Convention will also be taken in the light of the outcome of consideration of issues of significance to the Russian Federation at the first session of the Conference.

The State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation conveys to the Conference its wishes for fruitful work in the interests of peace and disarmament, and also expresses its hope for understanding and the constructive solution of the above-mentioned issues, thus facilitating ratification of the Convention by the Russian Federation.

Moscow
25 April 1997

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

UN
CD/1455
15 May 1997

Original: ENGLISH

HUNGARY, JAPAN

Draft mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on a
"Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines"

The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee under item 6 of its agenda to negotiate an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines.



CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

UN
CD/1456
15 May 1997

Original: ENGLISH

CANADA

Views on the Conference on Disarmament's agenda and programme of work

Current Debate

With regard to the three issues currently the main focus for debate, Canada's position is:

Nuclear Weapons

The CD must address nuclear disarmament. It should establish a mechanism for the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues with a view to identifying if and when one or more issues should be the subject of negotiation.

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

The CD should establish an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, based on the Shannon Paper and the mandate therein.

Anti-Personnel Landmines

Canada does not object to the proposal by Chile, Finland and Poland to appoint a Special Coordinator on Anti-Personnel Landmines.

CD Agenda/Work Programme

In putting forward the above current positions, Canada maintains its views on the CD Agenda/Work Programme as set out in its overview paper of January 21, 1997:

Proposed Work Programme

1. Weapons of Mass Destruction/Nuclear Disarmament
 - Prohibition of the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices
 - Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons
2. Conventional Disarmament
 - Transparency in armaments
 - Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers
3. Outer Space
 - Legally-binding Instrument to Prevent the Weaponization of Outer Space
4. Consideration and adoption of annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

UN
CD/1457
15 May 1997


Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 MAY 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDIA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE SECTION ON "DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY" OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT ADOPTED AT THE XII MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF THE MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES HELD IN NEW DELHI, 7-8 APRIL 1997

I have the honour to enclose herewith the section on 'Disarmament and International Security' (paras 54 to 71) of the Final Document adopted at the XII Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries held in New Delhi, 7-8 April, 1997.

I should be grateful if the enclosed document is circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Arundhati Ghose



EXTRACTS FROM THE FINAL DOCUMENT ADOPTED AT THE XIIth
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF THE MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED
COUNTRIES, NEW DELHI, APRIL 7-8, 1997

QUOTE

J DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

54. The Ministers noted that with the end of the cold war, there is no justification for nuclear arsenals, or concepts of international security based on promoting military alliances and policies of nuclear deterrence. While the end of the cold war had created unprecedented opportunities to promote this objective, regrettably there had been assertions which sought to justify continued reliance on nuclear doctrines, in certain cases against non-nuclear-weapon states. The Ministers recalled that the Cartagena Summit had called for the adoption of an Action Plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. They called upon the international community to join them in negotiating and implementing universal, non-discriminatory disarmament measures and mutually agreed confidence-building measures

55. The Ministers noted and welcomed the various international initiatives which stress that the opportunity now exists for the international community to pursue nuclear disarmament as a matter of the highest priority. They also noted that our present situation whereby nuclear-weapon states insist that nuclear weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet monopolize the right to own them, is highly discriminatory, unstable and cannot be sustained.

56. The declarations that nuclear weapons continue to offer security to the nuclear weapon states could contribute to the escalation of the nuclear threat and were contrary to their undertakings to fulfill nuclear disarmament obligations. Nuclear weapons continued to exist in massive numbers and in a state of operational readiness. It was imperative that security in the post-Cold War era should be promoted through drastic reductions in nuclear weapons and their eventual

elimination. They called for a series of agreed measures forming part of a programme for nuclear disarmament leading to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

57. The Ministers welcomed the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control". They noted and welcomed the growing body of authoritative international opinion which stressed that nuclear disarmament should be pursued by the international community as a matter of the highest priority. They recalled that a number of NAM countries had taken collective initiatives at the 50th and 51st UNGA sessions to underscore the need for urgent action in the field of nuclear disarmament, as mandated at the Cartagena Summit. The Ministers welcomed the useful work that had been done by a number of NAM countries, members of the Conference on Disarmament, in developing an Action Plan for nuclear disarmament within a time-bound framework.

58. The Ministers:

- called on the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on priority, an adhoc committee to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. A universal and legally binding multilateral agreement should be concluded committing all States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons;
- urged Nuclear Weapon States to agree to commence the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a legally binding international instrument to provide unconditional assurances to all non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

- urged Nuclear Weapon States to agree to commence negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a legally binding international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons;
- supported the convening of the Fourth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and
- expressed satisfaction at the work of the Working Group on Disarmament established by the NAM Coordinating Bureau in New York.

59. The Ministers noted with concern that, though the Chemical Weapons Convention will enter into force on 29 April, 1997, the two declared possessors of chemical weapons have still not ratified it, which jeopardises both the necessary universal and disarmament character of the Convention as originally conceived, which has been the guiding principle during the protracted negotiations through which the Convention was achieved. The Ministers emphasised that the First Conference of States Parties should adopt the appropriate measures towards ensuring that the Convention is operationalised in a fair, equitable and non-discriminatory manner that safeguards the principle of universality and the disarmament character integral to the Convention. The Ministers further emphasised that the outstanding issues before the Preparatory Commission needed to be satisfactorily resolved in order to ensure effective implementation of the Convention. In this context, they called on the developed countries to promote international cooperation through the transfer of technology, material and equipment for peaceful purposes in the chemical field and the removal of all existing multilateral as well as national discriminatory restrictions that

are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention

60 In the context of ongoing deliberations to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Ministers emphasised that, given the importance of biotechnology for economic development, any verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention should contain specific provisions to safeguard the security and economic interests of the developing countries, parties to the BWC. The strengthening of the BWC should provide for ensured access for peaceful purposes to the relevant material, equipment and technologies for their economic growth. While asserting that the Biological Weapons Convention inherently precludes the use of biological weapons, the Ministers emphasized their support for the explicit prohibition of the use of these weapons in the Convention. In this connection the Ministers noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran has formally presented a proposal to amend Article I of the title of the Convention to include the prohibition of use of biological weapons and urged an early reply from the state signatories to the inquiries by the depositories on this proposal.

61 The Ministers reaffirmed that global and regional approaches to disarmament are complementary and could be pursued simultaneously. They urged States in various regions of the world to negotiate agreements to promote greater balance in conventional armaments and restraint in the production and acquisition of conventional arms and, where necessary, for their progressive and balanced reduction, with a view to enhancing international and regional peace and security. They stressed that the peaceful resolution of regional and inter-State disputes is essential for the creation of conditions which would enable States to divert their resources from armaments to economic growth and development. Regional disarmament initiatives, to be practical, needed to take into account the special characteristics of each region and enhance the security of every state of the region concerned. The question of accumulation of conventional weapons beyond the legitimate requirements of states for self-defence

should also be addressed, taking into account the special characteristics of each region

62 The Ministers considered the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global Nuclear Disarmament. They urged States to conclude agreements with a view to creating nuclear-weapon free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of SSOD-1. In this context, they welcomed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones established by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba. The Ministers considered the question of the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in other parts of the world and agreed that this should be on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned and in conformity with the provisions of the Final Document of SSOD-I. The Ministers welcomed the effort of Mongolia to institutionalise its status as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

63 The Ministers reiterated their support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. To this end, the Ministers reaffirmed the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus. They called upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of such a zone and, pending its establishment, they called on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) without delay, and to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. They expressed great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States and they condemned Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. Stability can not be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are

maintained particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons which allow one party to threaten its neighbours and the region. They further welcomed the initiative by H.E. Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, on the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. They stressed that necessary steps should be taken in different international fora for the establishment of this zone. They also called for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear-related scientific or technological fields to Israel.

64. The Ministers welcomed the signing of "The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty" (Treaty of Pelindaba) in Cairo on 11 April, 1996 and affirmed that this treaty will further consolidate global efforts towards non-proliferation and contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security. The Ministers further affirmed that the establishment of NWFZs, especially in the Middle East, would enhance the security of Africa.

65. Consistent with the decisions adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Ministers of States Parties to the NPT called upon all states, particularly the nuclear weapon states, to fulfill their commitments, particularly those related to Article VI of the Treaty. They also emphasised the need to ensure and facilitate the exercise of the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented. In this context, the Ministers of the States Parties to the NPT called upon the Preparatory Commissions up to and including the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT to engage immediately in substantive work for the meaningful implementation of the obligations under the

Treaty and the commitments in the 1995 Principles and Objectives document

66. The Ministers of States signatories to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) took note of the opening of the CTBT for signature in 1996. They agreed that if the implications of the treaty are to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all State signatories, especially the nuclear weapon states, to nuclear disarmament will be essential.

67. The Ministers stated that in order to enhance international security and stability, all States Parties to non-proliferation, arms limitations and disarmament treaties should comply with and implement all provisions of such treaties. They emphasized that questions of non-compliance by States Parties should be resolved in a manner consistent with such treaties and international law. They further emphasized that any deviation from the role envisaged for the Security Council under the UN Charter or in certain circumstances under multilateral treaties on non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament would undermine the provisions of these treaties and conventions, including the inherent mechanisms for securing redress of violations of their provisions. Such deviations would also call into question the value of painstaking multilateral negotiations on disarmament and arms control treaties in the Conference on Disarmament. They underlined that circumventing or undermining the provisions of existing treaties will seriously prejudice the role of the Conference.

68. The Ministers expressed particular concern over the illicit transfer and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and their accumulation in many countries, which constituted a threat to the population and to national and regional security and were a factor contributing to destabilization of states. They urged states to take steps to deal effectively, through administrative and legislative means, with the increasing problem of illicit transfers of weapons, particularly small arms, which exacerbate tensions leading to strife, conflict and terrorism and impact negatively on

the socio-economic development of affected countries. In this regard, they welcomed the adoption of guidelines in 1996 for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36H of 6 September 1991 by the UN Disarmament Commission.

69. The Ministers welcomed the various bans, moratoria and other restrictions already declared by States on anti-personnel landmines and the growing consensus against the indiscriminate use and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. They also took note of the efforts to eliminate them as early as possible. In this regard the Ministers welcomed the decision taken by the Central American countries to constitute their region as an anti-personnel landmines free zone. The Ministers underlined that any negotiations to ban landmines should take into account the legitimate national security concerns of States as well as their legitimate rights to use appropriate measures for self-defence. They called for urgent and specific measures to ensure that affected countries had full access to material, equipment, technology and financial resources for mine clearance. Access to non-lethal technologies being developed to perform the legitimate defensive role of landmines would help generate support for their elimination. The Ministers also called for continued humanitarian assistance for victims of landmines.

70. The Ministers expressed concern about the residue of the Second World War, particularly in the form of landmines which cause human and material damage and obstruct development plans in some Non-Aligned countries. They called on the States responsible for laying the mines outside their territories to assume responsibility for the landmines, to cooperate with the affected countries, to provide the necessary information, maps and technical assistance for their clearance, to contribute towards defrayal of the costs of clearance and provide compensation for any ensuing losses.

71. The Ministers noted with concern that undue restrictions on export to

developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes persist. The Ministers emphasized that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. Non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development.

UNQUOTE

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1457/Corr.1

21 May 1997

ENGLISH ONLY

LETTER DATED 15 MAY 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF INDIA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON
DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE SECTION ON "DISARMAMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY" OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT ADOPTED AT
THE XII MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF THE MOVEMENT OF
NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES HELD IN NEW DELHI, 7-8 APRIL 1997


Corrigenda

Page 5, paragraph 60, line 11

For Article 1 of the read Article 1 and the

Page 9, paragraph 68, line 10

For 6 September 1991 read 6 December 1991



CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1458

22 May 1997

Original: ENGLISH

AUSTRALIA

Draft Decision

Without prejudice to its ongoing efforts to establish the Programme of Work for its 1997 session and in order to facilitate them, the Conference on Disarmament decides:

1. To appoint a Special Coordinator to conduct consultations on the most appropriate arrangement to deal with the question of anti-personal landmines under agenda item 6.
2. The Special Coordinator shall take into consideration all relevant proposals, present and future.
3. The Special Coordinator shall present an early report to the Conference on Disarmament.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1459
22 May 1997


Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 21 MAY 1997 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, TRANSMITTING A SUMMARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERT MEETING ON POSSIBLE VERIFICATION MEASURES FOR A CONVENTION TO BAN ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES, HELD IN KÖNIGSWINTER, GERMANY, ON 24 AND 25 APRIL 1997

I have the honour to refer to the statement made by the German delegation in the 762nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 27 March 1997 informing the Conference on the International Expert Meeting on possible verification measures for a convention to ban anti-personnel landmines on 24 and 25 April 1997 in Königswinter, Germany. The German Government welcomes the fruitful discussions during this expert meeting, in which 120 States participated, as a valuable impetus to the broad international discussion on the issue of the verification of a future convention banning anti-personnel landmines, as well as on the convention itself.

The German Government has announced its intention to forward the results of these discussions to the participating States as well as to international fora concerned with the mines problem. In consequence, I have the honour to attach a summary of the discussions during this expert meeting and would be very grateful if this summary could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and be distributed to delegations of all States Members of the Conference and of non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed): Dr. Günther Seibert
Ambassador



**International Expert Meeting on Possible Verification Measures
for a Convention to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines
Königswinter, 24 and 25 April 1997
SUMMARY**

In Resolution 51/45 S, which was supported by 156 states, the UN General Assembly called for an "effective, legally binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines with a view to completing the negotiations as soon as possible". In the international debate aimed at such an agreement the question of its verification proved to be complex and difficult. It became clear that it was necessary to discuss this issue in greater detail.

On Germany's initiative the "International Expert Meeting on Possible Verification Measures for a Convention to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines", which was to discuss the components of a possible verification system without entering into negotiations, therefore took place in Königswinter on 24 and 25 April 1997. In its invitation, Germany had agreed to draw up a short summary of the discussion not binding on the participants.

Just under half of the 120 participating states took part in the exchange of views by presenting statements. Some states pointed out that silence on individual areas of the discussion does not imply consent. The expert meeting gave further impetus to the broad international discussion on the issue of the verification of a future convention banning APL, as well as of the convention itself. The starting-point for the exchange of views was an option paper on verification submitted by Germany which included tried and tested elements from arms-control treaties (information exchange, routine and challenge inspections). A number of states circulated position papers. In the main, the exchange of views went as follows:

There was widespread agreement that, in view of the urgency of resolving the humanitarian problems caused by the irresponsible use of anti-personnel landmines, it is essential that an international convention on the comprehensive banning of anti-personnel landmines (use, production, stockpiling, export) be concluded as soon as possible. Two different approaches were put forward on the nature of the envisaged convention. While some delegations regarded the

convention primarily as an international humanitarian treaty, others considered it to be mainly an arms control agreement. These differing basic approaches also marked the debate on verification.

The advocates of a humanitarian convention spoke in favour of the quickest possible conclusion of a binding international convention banning anti-personnel landmines. In their view, traditional verification systems, such as the ones designed for weapons of mass destruction, cannot be applied due to the special nature of the APL (small, easy to transport, weapons of defence rather than attack from a tactical point of view). Essentially verification had to be restricted to voluntary measures by states. This would mean limiting it to a loose network of transparency and co-operation measures, regular revision of the treaty, international co-operation, information exchanges, as well as systematic reporting. Violations of convention provisions should, in addition, be deterred by means of national penal provisions.

In contrast, a number of states held the view that, despite its humanitarian character, the envisaged convention banning anti-personnel landmines had to be regarded partly, if not largely, as an arms-control instrument. Although the military effectiveness of APL was questionable and utterly out of proportion with the humanitarian consequences of their use, relinquishing an entire category of weapons would still represent a disarmament measure. Transparency and confidence were most likely to develop if the observance of treaty provisions were to be made verifiable through a reliable and detailed verification system.

Numerous states spoke in favour of an efficient and cost-effective verification system which takes into account the special requirements of this category of weapons. Several participants named the following elements as possible components of a verification system, in some cases with reference to arrangements in other conventions (e.g. CWC, CCW):

- transparency through a comprehensive information exchange by way of a reporting system subject to time-limits and, as a prerequisite to this, an obligation to take effective legislative and administrative implementation measures;
- co-operation and consultation among the states parties to resolve substantive issues and disputes;
- prosecution of treaty violations as well as regular revision of the efficiency of the convention with the possibility of renegotiation;

- fact-finding on the ground in order to monitor the national measures taken within the framework of transparency and, where there is sufficient evidence, to follow up on treaty violations;
- inclusion of the United Nations in verification.

During the debate some support began to emerge for a middle course combining comprehensive co-operation and transparency measures with the possibility of effective fact-finding. Important areas of a future convention - production, export, use, destruction of stockpiles and the treatment of minefields - may require differentiated verification measures. Routine inspections were given little chance of realization in statements at the conference.

The representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross advocated a verification regime on a voluntary basis. The ICBL representatives argued in favour of a slim-line regime and referred to their proposals of December 1996 on formulating a verification regime. The representative of the United Nations emphasized that the Austrian draft treaty as well as various elements discussed at the conference assigned to the Secretary-General as depositary tasks which exceeded what has hitherto been the norm. The international community could, he said, provide for such an arrangement in a convention but would then have to equip the Secretary-General to fulfil the tasks assigned to him, not least financially.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1460
26 May 1997

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH and RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 14 MAY 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING FOUR DOCUMENTS SIGNED AT THE JOINT U.S.-RUSSIAN SUMMIT MEETING IN HELSINKI, FINLAND, ON 21 MARCH 1997, NAMELY: A JOINT STATEMENT ON PARAMETERS ON FUTURE REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES, A JOINT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONCERNING THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY, A JOINT U.S.-RUSSIAN STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND A JOINT STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Attached are four documents signed at the joint U.S.-Russian summit meeting in Helsinki, Finland, on March 21, 1997. The documents are (1) a Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces, (2) a Joint Statement by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, (3) a Joint U.S.-Russian Statement on European Security, and (4) a Joint Statement on Chemical Weapons.

We would be grateful if you would issue these four documents together as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participant States of the CD.

(Signed): Katharine C. Crittenderger
Permanent Representative
of the United States to the
Conference on Disarmament

(Signed): Grigori V. Berdennikov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation
to the Conference on
Disarmament

JOINT STATEMENT ON PARAMETERS ON FUTURE REDUCTIONS
IN NUCLEAR FORCES

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin underscore that, with the end of the Cold War, major progress has been achieved with regard to strengthening strategic stability and nuclear security. Both the United States and Russia are significantly reducing their nuclear forces. Important steps have been taken to detarget strategic missiles. The START I Treaty has entered into force, and its implementation is ahead of schedule. Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine are nuclear-weapon free. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended on May 11, 1995 and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed by both the United States and Russia on September 24, 1996.

In another historic step to promote international peace and security, President Clinton and President Yeltsin hereby reaffirm their commitment to take further concrete steps to reduce the nuclear danger and strengthen strategic stability and nuclear security. The Presidents have reached an understanding on further reductions in and limitations on strategic offensive arms that will substantially reduce the roles and risks of nuclear weapons as we move forward into the next century. Recognizing the fundamental significance of the ABM Treaty for these objectives, the Presidents have, in a separate joint statement, given instructions on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, which will allow for deployment of effective theater missile defenses and prevent circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

With the foregoing in mind, President Clinton and President Yeltsin have reached the following understandings.

Once START II enters into force, the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement, which will include, among other things, the following basic components:

- Establishment, by December 31, 2007, of lower aggregate levels of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads for each of the parties.
- Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads and any other jointly agreed technical and

organizational measures, to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads.

- Resolving issues related to the goal of making the current START treaties unlimited in duration.
- Placement in a deactivated status of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under START II by December 31, 2003, by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps. The United States is providing assistance through the Nunn-Lugar program to facilitate early deactivation.

The Presidents have reached an understanding that the deadline for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under the START II Treaty will be extended to December 31, 2007. The sides will agree on specific language to be submitted to the Duma and, following Duma approval of START II, to be submitted to the United States Senate.

In this context, the Presidents underscore the importance of prompt ratification of the START II Treaty by the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

The Presidents also agreed that in the context of START III negotiations their experts will explore, as separate issues, possible measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate confidence building and transparency measures.

Taking into account all the understandings outlined above, and recalling their statement of May 10, 1995, the Presidents agreed the sides will also consider the issues related to transparency in nuclear materials.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

William J. Clinton

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

Yeltsin

Helsinki

March 21, 1997

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
CONCERNING THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

President Clinton and President Yeltsin, expressing their commitment to strengthening strategic stability and international security, emphasizing the importance of further reductions in strategic offensive arms, and recognizing the fundamental significance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for these objectives as well as the necessity for effective theater missile defense (TMD) systems, consider it their common task to preserve the ABM Treaty, prevent circumvention of it, and enhance its viability.

The Presidents reaffirm the principles of their May 10, 1993 Joint Statement, which will serve as a basis for reaching agreement on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, including:

- The United States and Russia are each committed to the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability.
- Both sides must have the option to establish and to deploy effective theater missile defense systems. Such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty.
- Theater missile defense systems may be deployed by each side which (1) will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and (2) will not be tested to give such systems that capability.
- Theater missile defense systems will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other.
- The scale of deployment -- in number and geographic scope -- of theater missile defense systems by either side will be consistent with theater ballistic missile programs confronting that side.

In this connection, the United States and Russia have recently devoted special attention to developing measures aimed at assuring confidence of the Parties that their ballistic missile defense activities will not lead to circumvention of the ABM Treaty, to which the Parties have repeatedly reaffirmed their adherence.

The efforts undertaken by the Parties in this regard are reflected in the Joint Statement of the Presidents of the United States and Russia issued on September 28, 1994, as well as in that of May 10, 1995. Important decisions were made at the United States-Russia summit meeting on April 23, 1996.

In order to fulfill one of the primary obligations under the ABM Treaty -- the obligation not to give non-ABM systems capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles and not to test them in an ABM mode -- the Presidents have instructed their respective delegations to complete the preparation of an agreement to ensure fulfillment of this requirement.

In Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) negotiations on the problem of demarcation between TMD systems and ABM systems, the United States and Russia, together with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, successfully finished negotiations on demarcation with respect to lower-velocity TMD systems. The Presidents note that agreements were also reached in 1996 with respect to confidence-building measures and ABM Treaty succession. The Presidents have instructed their experts to complete an agreement as soon as possible for prompt signature on higher-velocity TMD systems.

Neither side has plans before April 1999 to flight test, against a ballistic target missile, TMD interceptor missiles subject to the agreement on demarcation with respect to higher velocity TMD systems. Neither side has plans for TMD systems with interceptor missiles faster than 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air-based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea-based systems. Neither side has plans to test TMD systems against target missiles with MIRVs or against reentry vehicles deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles.

The elements for the agreement on higher-velocity TMD systems are:

- The velocity of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 5 km/sec.
- The flight range of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 3500 km.
- The sides will not develop, test, or deploy space-based TMD interceptor missiles or components based on other physical principles that are capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles.
- The sides will exchange detailed information annually on TMD plans and programs.

The Presidents noted that TMD technology is in its early stages and continues to evolve. They agreed that developing effective TMD while maintaining a viable ABM Treaty will require continued consultations. To this end, they reaffirm that their representatives to the Standing Consultative Commission will discuss, as foreseen under the ABM Treaty, any questions or concerns either side may have regarding TMD activities, including matters related to the agreement to be completed on higher-velocity systems, which will be based on this joint statement by the two Presidents, with a view to precluding violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty. These consultations will be facilitated by the agreed detailed annual information exchange on TMD plans and programs.

The Presidents also agreed that there is considerable scope for cooperation in theater missile defense. They are prepared to explore integrated cooperative defense efforts, inter alia, in the provision of early warning support for TMD activities, technology cooperation in areas related to TMD, and expansion of the ongoing program of cooperation in TMD exercises.

In resolving the tasks facing them, the Parties will act in a spirit of cooperation, mutual openness, and commitment to the ABM Treaty.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

William J. Clinton

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

Yeltsin

Helsinki

March 21, 1997

JOINT U.S.-RUSSIAN STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin discussed the present security situation in the Euro-Atlantic region. They reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of building a stable, secure, integrated and undivided democratic Europe. The roles of the United States and Russia as powers with worldwide responsibilities place upon them a special requirement to cooperate closely to this end. They confirmed that this cooperation will be guided by the spirit of openness and pragmatism which has increasingly come to characterize the U.S.-Russian relationship in recent years.

Recalling their May 1995 Joint Statement on European Security, the Presidents noted that lasting peace in Europe should be based on the integration of all of the continent into a series of mutually supporting institutions and relationships that ensure that there will be no return to division or confrontation. No institution by itself can ensure security. The Presidents agreed that the evolution of security structures should be managed in a way that threatens no state and that advances the goal of building a more stable and integrated Europe. This evolution should be based on a broad commitment to the principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, the Budapest Code of Conduct and other OSCE documents, including respect for human rights, democracy and political pluralism, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security.

The Presidents are convinced that strengthening the OSCE, whose potential has yet to be fully realized, means the interests of the United States and Russia. The Presidents expressed their satisfaction with the outcome of the Lisbon Summit of the OSCE and agreed on the importance of implementing its decisions, both to define further the goals of security cooperation and to continue to devise innovative methods for carrying out the growing number of tasks the OSCE has assumed.

They underscored their commitment to enhance the operational capability of the OSCE as the only framework for European security cooperation providing for full and equal participation of all states. The rule of consensus should remain an inviolable basis for OSCE decision-making. The Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to work together in the ongoing OSCE effort to develop a model for security in Europe which takes account of the radically changed situation on the eve of the 21st century and the decisions of the Lisbon Summit concerning a charter on European security. The OSCE's essential role in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its ability to develop new forms of peacekeeping and conflict prevention should also be actively pursued.

In their talks in Helsinki, the two Presidents paid special attention to the question of relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation. They continued to disagree on the issue of NATO enlargement. In order to minimize the potential consequences of this disagreement, the Presidents agreed that they should work, both together and with others, on a document that will establish cooperation between NATO and Russia as an important element of a new comprehensive European security system. Signed by the leaders of the NATO countries and Russia, this document would be an enduring commitment at the highest political level. They further agreed that the NATO-Russia relationship, as defined in this document, should provide for consultation, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible where appropriate, joint decision-making and action on security issues of common concern.

The Presidents noted that the NATO-Russia document would reflect and contribute both to the profound transformation of NATO, including its political and peacekeeping dimension, and to the new realities of Russia as it builds a democratic society. It will also reflect the shared commitment of both NATO and Russia to develop their relations in a manner that enhances mutual security.

The Presidents recalled the historic significance of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in establishing the trust necessary to build a common security space on the continent in the interest of all states in Europe, whether or not they belong to a military or political alliance, and to continue to preclude any destabilizing build-up of forces in different regions of Europe.

The Presidents stressed the importance of adapting the CFE Treaty. They agreed on the need to accelerate negotiations among CFE parties with a view to concluding by late spring or early summer of 1997 a framework agreement setting forth the basic elements of an adapted CFE Treaty, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Document on Scope and Parameters agreed at Lisbon in December 1996.


President Yeltsin underscored Russian concerns that NATO enlargement will lead to a potentially threatening build-up of permanently stationed combat forces of NATO near to Russia. President Clinton stressed that the Alliance contemplates nothing of the kind.

President Yeltsin welcomed President Clinton's statements and affirmed that Russia would exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.

President Clinton also noted NATO's policy on nuclear weapons deployments, as articulated by the North Atlantic Council on December 10, 1996, that NATO members have "no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of states that are not now members of the Alliance, nor do they foresee any future need to do so. President Clinton noted NATO's willingness to include specific reference to this policy in the NATO-Russia document. President Yeltsin spoke in favor of including such a reference in the document.

The Presidents agreed that the United States, Russia and all their partners in Europe face many common security challenges that can best be addressed through cooperation among all the states of the Euro-Atlantic area. They pledged to intensify their efforts to build on the common ground identified in their meetings in Helsinki to improve the effectiveness of European security institutions, including by concluding the agreements and arrangements outlined in this statement.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

Handwritten signature of William J. Clinton in dark ink.

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

Handwritten signature of Yury Izrael in dark ink.

Helsinki

March 21, 1994

JOINT STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

President Clinton and President Yeltsin discussed issues relating to the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. They stressed the commitment of the United States and Russia to full and effective accomplishment of the tasks and objectives of the Convention.


The Presidents reaffirmed their intention to take the steps necessary to expedite ratification in each of the two countries. President Clinton expressed his determination that the United States be a party when the Convention enters into force in April of this year, and is strongly urging prompt Senate action. President Yeltsin noted that the Convention had been submitted to the Duma with his strong recommendation for prompt ratification.

Mindful of their special role and responsibility in the matter of chemical disarmament, the United States and Russia understand that their participation in the Convention is important to its effective implementation and universality.

The Presidents noted that cooperation between the two countries in the prohibition of chemical weapons has enabled both countries to enhance openness regarding their military chemical potential and to gain experience with procedures and measures for verifying compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Parties will continue cooperation between them in chemical disarmament.

The United States will seek appropriation of necessary funds to build a facility for the destruction of neuroparalytic toxins in Russia as previously agreed.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:



FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:



Helsinki

March 21, 1997